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WARTIME ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES: FINANCING
THE CLEANUP
MEREDITH DuBARRY HusToN*
"If trees could speak they would cry out, that since they are not
the cause of war, it is wrong for them to bear its penalties."
-Hugo Grotius, DE JURE BELLE AC PACIS, 16251
1. INTRODUCrION
Despite laws designed to prohibit or deter the environmental
damages that result from belligerent conduct, in reality, they are an
inevitable consequence of war. Such damages have occasionally
been the result of deliberate military strategy. But more often, the
environmental damages wrought by war are unintentional. Where
prevention has failed, ex post remedies have been developed to
deal with economic compensation for and remediation of the envi-
ronmental effects of combat. The United Nations Compensation
Commission's ("UNCC") response to the environmental damages
caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait represents a significant ad-
vance towards ensuring compensation for environmental damages
by responsible parties, yet it falls short of a perfect solution, par-
ticularly in light of some of the most recent environmental conse-
quences of belligerent conduct: the attack on the World Trade
Center and the subsequent dispersal of anthrax through the mail.
An alternative fund dedicated specifically to environmental dam-
ages may better address their unique attributes, although its suc-
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bury College (Environmental Studies), 1997. I would like to thank my parents, for
their infinite support, and Scott, for his unending patience. This Comment is
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possible.
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cess also faces some challenges, including establishing a source of
financing.
To understand the need for ex post remedies, it is first neces-
sary to understand how well existing law forestalls the need to ex-
ercise them. Section 2 of this Comment discusses four important
provisions prohibiting environmentally destructive belligerent
conduct. Section 3 examines one option available when preventive
measures fail, specifically examining the environmental conse-
quences of the Persian Gulf War and the ensuing United Nations
effort to procure and distribute compensation for the devastation
caused by Iraq's deliberate spillage of oil and burning of oil wells.
This Section analyzes the structure and function of the UNCC, its
specific efforts to deal with environmental claims, and its endeavor
to gather funds from Iraq, and asks whether the UNCC can serve
as a model for compensation for environmental damages in other
combat contexts. Section 4 considers the environmental conse-
quences of and potential economic liability for the cleanup from
the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center and the dis-
semination of anthrax through the U.S. Postal Service. Section 5
examines the viability of a separate international fund for envi-
ronmental damages as an answer to the issues of liquidity and pri-
oritization that plague current remedies for environmentally harm-
ful belligerent conduct. Such a fund might be financed through
voluntary contributions, a system of taxes, or permit fees.
This Comment concludes, in Section 6, that as long as parties
engage in conflict, the environmental consequences of belligerent
conduct cannot be ignored. In light of the changed nature of war-
fare after September 11, where state governments may not be the
only parties responsible for launching significant attacks, it is more
important than ever that alternative financing schemes for ex post
remedies be explored.
2. RULES OF LAW: RESTRICTIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF
BELLIGERENTS
Before looking at how combat-related environmental damages
are compensated, it is important to see what types of conduct are
prohibited under current rules of law. As outlined below, the ex-
isting limitations on belligerent conduct do not enjoin all actions
that may negatively impact the environment. For many environ-
mental injuries, there will be no remedies available at all.
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2.1. Early Efforts: The Hague Conventions and Geneva Law
Early efforts to codify the laws of war were made at the Hague
Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907. Because the Hague Conven-
tions are considered to be customary law today, they are binding
on states that were not originally formal parties to the agreements.
2
The 1899 Hague Convention Number I and its annexed regula-
tions, addressing the customs and laws of war on land, were "the
first successful effort to codify existing customary laws of war."
3
Convened in 1907, the Second Hague Peace Conference slightly
amended and replaced the 1899 Hague Convention Number II
with Convention IV.4 The regulations of the Hague Conventions,
reflecting a balance between the principles of proportionality 5 and
military necessity,6 provide limited environmental protection from
warfare by protecting property.7
Article 22 of the 1907 Hague Regulations sets forth the princi-
ple underlying all laws of war: "[T]he right of belligerents to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."8 This concept of
2 In 1946, the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal noted that "by 1939
these rules... were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as be-
ing declaratory of the laws and customs of war." ThE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLCrs
57 (Dietrich Schindler & Jifi Toman eds., 2d ed. 1981) (citation omitted) [hereinaf-
ter ARMED CONFLICS].
3 Major Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage
During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REv. 1, 7
(1992).
4 The 1899 Convention remained in effect for the "17 states who ratified the
1899 Convention and did not ratify the 1907 version." Stephanie N. Simonds,
Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International Legal
Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 165, 170 n.19 (1992).
5 Proportionality "is perhaps best characterized as the principle of customary
international law that prohibits injury or damage disproportionate to the military
advantage sought by an action." Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of
the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. IN'L L. 1, 55 (1997)
[hereinafter Green War].
6 "Military necessity prohibits destructive or harmful acts that are unneces-
sary to secure a military advantage .... [The act must be neither wanton nor of
marginal military value, and military motivations must underlie it." Id. at 52.
7 See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex
to Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]
(stating that "private property cannot be confiscated" and "the property of mu-
nicipalities... shall be treated as private property. All seizure of, destruction, or
wilful damage done to institutions of this character.., is forbidden, and should
be made the subject of legal proceedings.").
8 Id. art. 22.
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"limits" provides protection for the environment. Article 55 of the
regulations provides that "[t ] he occupying state shall be regarded
only as administrator and usufructuary 9 of public buildings, real
estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile
State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the
capital of these properties in accordance with the rules of usu-
fruct."' 0 Under this principle, the occupying power may not per-
manently alter or destroy enemy territory and "may not act irre-
sponsibly or maliciously in" using the natural resources found
therein." Article 23(g) provides another source of limits on envi-
ronmentally harmful behavior, although it is directed specifically
at property rather than at natural resources: "it is especially for-
bidden... [t]o destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war."' 2 But the exercise of limits on environmental destruction
is not absolute. Destruction may be permissible if armed conflict
occurs within occupied territory and military necessity so re-
quires.13 The use of military necessity as a test to establish permis-
sible methods of warfare raises questions about the effectiveness of
the regulations' environmental protection, as military necessity it-
self is a possible exculpatory defense for environmental destruction
during war.14
A penalty for parties violating the regulations, absent from the
1899 Convention, was added to the 1907 Hague Convention Num-
ber IV in Article 3: "A belligerent party which violates the provi-
9 "Usufruct" means "the legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits
of something belonging to another." A usufructary is "one having the use or en-
joyment of something" or "having the character of a usufruct." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1299 (9th ed. 1991).
10 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 55.
11 Michael N. Schmitt, War and the Environment: Fault Lines in the Prescriptive
Landscape, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR 87, 95 (Jay E. Austin &
Carl E. Bruch eds., 2000).
12 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 7, art. 23(g).
13 Sharp, supra note 3, at 11.
14 Stephanie Simonds cites two World War II cases where German com-
manders charged with "wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devas-
tation not justified by military necessity" under a provision based on Article 23(g)
were exculpated following their pleas of military necessity. Simonds, supra note 4,
at 169 n.15 (1992) (citing The Hostages Trial: Wilhelm List and Others, in 8 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 66-69 (1948) and The German High Com-
mand Trial: Wilhelm van Leeb and Others, 12 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 1,125-26 (1949)).
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sions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to
pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by
persons forming part of its armed forces." 15 However, as the con-
vention does not provide a mechanism for enforcing these civil
penalties and it does not provide for criminal sanctions, the civil
liability measure is of limited effectiveness.' 6
Rules concerning the protection of war victims developed as a
part of the Geneva Law beginning with the Geneva Convention I
of 1864.17 The Fourth Geneva Convention of 194918 includes sev-
eral provisions that provide protection for the environment
through protection of property. Article 33's prohibition of pillage
and "[r]eprisals against protected persons and their property" pro-
vides one example.19 Article 53 outlaws "[a]ny destruction by the
Occupying Power of... property belonging... to the State or to
other public authorities.., except where such destruction is ren-
dered absolutely necessary by military operations." 20 Article 147
defines the "extensive destruction and appropriation of property,
not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly" as one of several "grave breaches" of the Convention.21
Articles 146 and 148 establish criminal and civil liability for grave
breaches of the Convention.22 Again, military necessity provides a
defense for destructive conduct. Situations are rare, if ever, where
necessity does not excuse this conduct.
Is Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 3, 36 Stat. 2277, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 1907 Hague
Convention No. IV].
16 See Sharp, supra note 3, at 12 ("[Tjhis convention does not address individ-
ual criminal liability for a violation of its regulations .... ").
17 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 129 Consol. T.S. 361 (mandating
relief for the wounded and stating the neutrality of medical personnel). The Ge-
neva Conventions of 1906, 1929, and 1949 on the same subject replaced the origi-
nal convention. ARMED CoNFLIcrs, supra note 2, at 213.
18 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion IV]. This Convention was commonly known as the "Civilians' Convention."
Id.
19 Id. art. 33.
2 Id. art. 53.
21 Id. art. 147.
22 Id. arts. 146, 148. See also Sharp, supra note 3, at 17 ("[A]rticle 148 acknowl-
edges civil liability of the state for grave breaches of the Convention.").
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A key question about the protection from wartime environ-
mental damages provided by the 1907 Hague Convention IV and
Geneva Convention IV pertains to "the extent to which the term
'property' can be interpreted to encompass public goods (not nec-
essarily under specific ownership) such as common land, forests,
the atmosphere, water resources, and the open seas." 23 If property
is construed broadly, the conventions may constitute powerful
protection for the environment from wartime environmental dam-
ages. A narrower definition of property, however, may limit their
utility as environmental protection measures.
2.2. Modern Efforts: Protocol I and ENMOD
Most military treaties, like the 1907 Hague Convention IV and
Geneva Convention IV, provide indirect environmental protection
through measures safeguarding property and human welfare. By
contrast, Protocol I of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 ("Protocol I") 24 and the Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques ("ENMOD") 25 directly address protection
of the environment.26 Spurred by international objection to the en-
vironmental impact of the U.S. military's techniques during the
Vietnam War, including the use of defoliant herbicides, incendiary
weapons and rainmaking techniques, Protocol I and ENMOD re-
flect a growing international consciousness of environmental val-
ues.2
7
Articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol I "prohibit wartime damage
even when the environment is a military objective or when the
military objective outweighs the damage to the environment."
28
23 Adam Roberts, The Law of War and Environmental Damage, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 11, at 47,57.
24 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I].
25 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of En-
vironmental Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T.
333,1108 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter ENMOD].
26 "ENMOD and the environmental provisions of Protocol I effectively give
nature 'standing'-that is they do not depend upon direct injury of identifiable
human beings." Michael D. Diederich, Jr., "Law of War" and Ecology-A Proposal for
a Workable Approach to Protecting the Environment Through the Law of War, 136 MIL.
L. REV. 137, 152 (1992).
27 See id. at 149-52 (describing the impetus behind Protocol I).
28 Simonds, supra note 4, at 173.
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Article 35(3) states: "It is prohibited to employ methods or means
of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause wide-
spread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environ-
ment."29 The International Committee of the Red Cross Commen-
tary on Protocol I establishes a clearer definition for the term
"environment" than exists for "property" under the 1907 Hague
Convention IV or Geneva Convention IV, explaining that "[t]he
concept of the natural environment should be understood in the
widest sense to cover the biological environment in which a popu-
lation is living."30 Article 55 parallels Article 35(3)'s protection
from widespread, long-term, and severe damage, and adds, "This
protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the
health or survival of the population."31 Unlike Article 35(3), this
article requires environmental protection, not for its own sake, but
because it serves to protect the population. Military necessity does
not provide a defense for environmental destruction under either
article.
If parties are found to have violated the terms of Protocol I, Ar-
ticle 91 provides for civil liability: "A party to the conflict which
violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall,
if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation." 32 It is
unlikely, however, that parties will ever have to pay under this
provision. Although Protocol I directly requires consideration of
the environmental consequences of combat, its effectiveness is un-
clear for several reasons. First, while the omission of military ne-
cessity exemptions for Articles 35(3) and 55 of Protocol I strength-
ens the environmental protection provided, the refusal of several
major powers to ratify the treaty in the absence of such an excep-
tion has left Protocol I with little meaningful legal force. 33 Second,
29 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 35(3).
30 INTERNATIONAL COMMIrrTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGusT 1949 AND
RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLCTS
(PROTOCOL I) 662, para. 2126 [hereinafter COMMENTARY], available at http://www
.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/la13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/7b82dfccllfae4c5cl2563cdO
0434dbc?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
31 Protocol I, supra note 24, art. 55.
32 Id. art. 91.
33 The United States, United Kingdom and former Soviet Union, among oth-
ers, are signatories to Protocol I but have not ratified it. Seeming to disregard the
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although the term "environment" is clearly defined, the terms "se-
vere," "long-term," and "widespread" leave room for a range of
interpretations. 34 For example, for the ENMOD Convention, dis-
cussed below, "the term 'long-lasting' was defined as lasting for a
period of months or approximately a season, while for the Protocol
'long-term' was interpreted as a matter of decades."35 Because of
this vagueness, combatants may be able to interpret the provisions
in a manner most favorable to their actions. Finally, a group of
critics has argued that the articles "will not impose any significant
limitation on combatants waging conventional warfare.
It... would [only] affect such unconventional means of warfare as
the massive use of herbicides or chemical agents which could pro-
duce widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural en-
vironment."36 While protection from unconventional warfare is an
important step in preventing environmental injury from combat,
further measures may be needed to solve the problems caused by
conventional combat if the critics are correct.
ENMOD, the first treaty to address the environmental impacts
of combat as a distinct concern, represented a significant advance
in the environmental law of war.37 Article I of ENMOD requires
parties "not to engage in military or any other hostile use of envi-
ronmental modification techniques having widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or in-
potential environmental impact of nuclear weapons, the United States declared on
signature "the rules established by this protocol were not intended to have any
effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons." ARMED
CONFLICTS, supra note 2, at 631-32.
34 See Christopher D. Stone, The Environment in Wartime: An Overview, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 11, at 16, 21 ("[G]iven the
vagueness of the terms - how 'severe'? how 'widespread'? - the import of this ar-
ticle is unclear."). See also Simonds, supra note 4, at 173-74 (discussing the negotia-
tion history of the ambiguous terms in Articles 35(3) and 55).
35 COMMENTARY, supra note 30, para. 1452.
36 Roberts, supra note 23, at 62 (citing MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR
VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 348 (1982)).
37 See Richard Falk, The Environmental Law of War, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR 78, 90-91 (Glen Plant ed., 1992) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION] ("ENMOD is an important step forward. It ad-
dresses the problem of environmental harm in war as a distinct concern for the
first time. It prohibits a wide range of potential techniques and may indirectly
discourage research and development of the technologies and skills supportive of
environmental modification capabilities.").
[23:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss4/6
WARTIME ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
jury to any other State Party."38 Environmental modification tech-
niques are defined as "any technique for changing-through the
deliberate manipulation of natural processes-the dynamics, com-
position or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere,
hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space."39 The term "en-
vironment" is viewed even more broadly under ENMOD than un-
der Protocol I.
However, ENMOD is not without drawbacks. The treaty also
fails to cover damages caused by conventional combat techniques.
Environmental protection conferred by ENMOD is "limited to the
manipulation of such forces as earthquakes, tidal waves, ocean
currents, the ozone layer and climate."40 Most environmental con-
sequences of war will not result from such deliberate manipulation
of natural processes. Also, as with Protocol I, the definitions of
"widespread,"' "long-lasting," and "severe" remain open to inter-
pretation and allow implicated parties to interpret the treaty in the
light most favorable to them.41 While Understanding I of the Con-
ference of the Committee on Disarmament outlined more specific
definitions for these terms, many ENMOD signatories opposed the
proposal, eliminating the possibility of clarity.42 ENMOD is like-
wise restrained by its enforcement regime as its "scope is limited to
damage caused by parties" and it provides no specific remedy
33 ENMOD, supra note 25, art. 1.
39 Id. art. 2.
40 Glen Plant, Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcTION, supra note 37, at 3,
23.
41 It should be noted that the UN Conference of the Committee on Disarma-
ment (CCD), the drafters of ENMOD, considered the criteria of widespread, long-
lasting, and severe to be alternative rather than cumulative criteria (using the word"or" rather than "and" in the document). The analogue terms in Protocol I are
generally interpreted as cumulative, thus creating a higher threshold of acceptable
environmental harm. Glen Plant, Environmental Damage and the Laws of War: Points
Addressed to Military Lawyers, in EFFECTING COMPLIANCE 159,168 (Hazel Fox & Mi-
chael A. Meyer eds., 1993).
42 See Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting from the NATO Mili-
tary Action Against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117, 129 (2000) ("Thus, Un-
derstanding I does not represent a consensus even among the signatories as to the
meaning of those terms." (citing Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modi-
fication Through the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Greening" the Interna-
tional Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, 11
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 793, 807 (1996))).
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other than referral to the United Nations Security Council for "en-
forcement action."
43
2.3. Summary
This examination of the existing rules of law and their effect on
wartime environmental protection reveals several deficiencies.
Without a complete ban on environmentally harmful activities, en-
forcement is hampered by the difficulty of establishing that the en-
vironmental injuries resulted from "hostile intent."
44 The subjec-
tivity of such determinations, directed by vague guidelines like
"widespread ... effects" also impedes preservation of the wartime
environment. 45 Only Protocol I and ENMOD impose an absolute
ban on environmentally destructive action, regardless of military
necessity. However, even these provisions are subject to excep-
tions (e.g., if damage is not considered long-term, it will be ex-
cused). A lack of synergy and coherence between existing provi-
sions has created a series of prohibitions riddled with loopholes.
The absence of effective punishments for environmentally destruc-
tive conduct reinforces the ineffectiveness of the current system as
a deterrent for environmental harm through combat.
46
3. WHEN PREVENTION FAILS: EX POST REMEDIES
Restrictions on the use of specific weapons and tactics that
negatively impact the environment only provide part of the strat-
egy for dealing with the environmental consequences of war.
While it is preferable to prevent all damage to the environment
during combat, it may not always be possible to direct the attention
of military commanders toward environmental protection and
43 Green War, supra note 5, at 85. As Schmitt notes, "[T]he Security Council
already is empowered under the Charter to take appropriate actions in response
to most potential breaches of ENMOD; the Convention's enforcement provisions
add little new power." Id.
44 A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 111 (1996) (citing J. Goldblat, The
ENMOD Convention: A Critical Review, 2 HuMANrrARES VOLKERRECHT
INFORMATIONSSCHRIFTEN 83 (1993)).
45 Falk, supra note 37, at 92-94. "As matters now stand, the existing legal
framework relevant to wartime environmental harm is gravely compromised by
the extent of its subjectivity." Id. at 93.
46 See id. at 92-94 (examining "the main deficiencies of the international law of
war when it comes to environmental protection in war and in relation to military
activities"). See also Green War, supra note 5, at 95-96 (discussing the shortfalls of
the present environmental law of international armed conflict).
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away from military objectives during the course of hostilities. Ex
post remedies are necessary to deal with situations where military
necessity appears to override environmental protection. When
weighing the military necessity of action that will affect the envi-
ronment, an effective system of prospective future damages or
punishment may tip the balance in favor of environmental protec-
tion. If, considering future damages, the balance still tips in favor
of military action and environmental destruction is not averted, ex
post remedies can facilitate the post-conflict recovery of the af-
fected area by providing funds for cleanup or other assistance.47
The undertakings of the UNCC following the Persian Gulf War
provide a good example of how ex post remedies can be used to
deal with the environmental impact of war.
3.1. Oil Spill and Oil Fires: Environmental Consequences of the
Kuwaiti Oil Catastrophe
Two days after the beginning of the 1990 Persian Gulf War
bombing campaign on Iraq, the Iraqis opened the flow of oil into
the Persian Gulf.48 By the end of the war, 600 miles of sea surface
were covered by an oil slick containing somewhere between four
and six million barrels of oil and 300 miles of coastline were con-
taminated by the deliberate spill.49 Iraq then set fire to or other-
wise damaged between 500 and 80050 producing Kuwaiti oil wells.
During May and June of 1990, "4.5 million barrels of oil per day
were lost to the fires."51
Despite the allied forces' rapid response to Iraq's actions,5 2
Kuwait's flora and fauna, air, soil, and water suffered devastating
effects:
47 See Christopher D. Stone, The Environment in Wartime: An Overview, in THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 11, at 16, 27-30 (discussing the
role of ex post remedies in deterring environmental damages).
48 Green War, supra note 5, at 17-18 (citing Peter Ford, Vital Saudi Water Plant
Prepares for Oil Slick, CHRISrIAN Sci. MONIrOR, Feb. 1,1991, at 1). Schmitt notes that
some of the oil spilled into the Gulf during the conflict came from Coalition bomb-
ing, but that these releases were "dwarfed by those of the Iraqis." Id. at 17-18.
49 Sharp, supra note 3, at 41.
50 Different sources cite varying numbers of total wells destroyed. See, e.g.,
Green War, supra note 5, at 18 ("By the end of the hostilities, the Iraqis had dam-
aged or destroyed 590 oil well heads."); Sharp, supra note 3, at 45 ("A total of 732
producing oil wells in Kuwait were set on fire or damaged.").
51 Green War, supra note 5, at 19.
52 Following Iraq's initial release of oil, the "U.S. Department of Defense im-
mediately established an oil spill task force." U.S. air strikes halted the supply of
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Air quality was severely impaired over the short term by
the plumes of smoke, which stretched at one point for over
100 kilometers. The soils in and around the oil lakes were
contaminated to varying extents, and soil farther away was
covered by combusted and partially combusted oil particu-
lates spread by the smoke plumes. Leachates from these
oil-contaminated soils have entered the groundwater. Nu-
merous birds and animals were either killed in the fires, or
drowned in the oil lakes. In addition to the fires, Kuwait's
fragile desert ecosystems and vital urban infrastructure
were adversely impacted by the movement of vehicles,
digging of trenches, aerial bombardment, and placement of
thousands of landmines.
5 3
The marine environment of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea were
similarly devastated by the enormous oil spill and by fallout from
the oil fires.54
3.2. Resolution 687: The United Nations Compensation Commission
As neither the release of oil into the Gulf nor the torching of the
oil wells afforded Iraq a significant military advantage, Iraq's con-
duct could not be excused under the customary principle of mili-
tary necessity.5 5 After the conflict, Iraq argued that "the oil wells
had been damaged as a result of allied bombing by coalition forces
or, alternatively, by explosives planted on the oil wells by Iraq's
enemies 'in order to incriminate Iraq."' 56 Despite these assertions,
oil to the terminal spilling oil into the Gulf. Teams of experts were sent to provide
technical experience and the United States and the United Kingdom provided
equipment to help contain the pollution. ROGERS, supra note 44, at 123.
53 Jessica D. Jacoby, Introduction to Part IliA, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 11, at 297, 298.
54 See Mahmood Y. Abdulraheem, War-Related Damage to the Marine Environ-
ment in the ROPME Sea Area, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra
note 11, at 338, 345 (discussing the environmental damage to the Persian Gulf
from the 1990-91 Gulf War, including the distribution of oil and oil-bum products
in the marine environment).
55 "Iraq's actions were militarily disproportionate, wantonly destructive of
civilian assets, and had unnecessarily destroyed property." Sharp, supra note 3, at
44-46 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS-GULF
POLLUTION TASK FORCE, EXECUTIvE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR 5 (1992)).
56 Roger P. Alford, Well Blowout Control Claims in International Decisions, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 287, 289 (1998) (quoting Decision Concerning the Well Blowout Control
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Security Council Resolution 687 established Iraq's liability "under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including environ-
mental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to
foreign Governments, nationals, and corporations, as a result of
Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."57 Resolution
687 also established a fund to compensate parties injured by Iraq
during the Gulf War.58 Resolution 692 established the UNCC to
administer payments from the fund for claims arising under Reso-
lution 687.59
As a subsidiary of the U.N. Security Council, the UNCC can
perform any function the Security Council has authority to per-
form itself.60 Some, including Iraq, argue that the quasi-judicial
functions of the UNCC go beyond its legitimate powers. Iraq com-
plained, "[T]he Council has exceeded its mandate .... It is not a
judicial body consisting of independent, impartial judges compe-
tent to rule on compensation for those entitled to it in any con-
flict."61 Cuba argued that the claims should be heard by the Inter-
national Court of Justice, as the U.N. Charter only refers to
compensation or restitution in the context of that body.62 How-
ever, the U.N. Charter does not limit the decision of legal questions
to the International Court of Justice and these objections ultimately
failed.63 The UNCC is seen as "an essentially administrative mass
claims system" rather than as a judicial body.64
Claim, Governing Council of the U.N. Compensation Commission, 66th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.40 (1996)).
57 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg., para. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
5S See id. para. 18 (establishing the fund and a Commission to administer it).
59 S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 2987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (1991).
60 "U.N. Charter article 29 provides that the Security Council may create
,such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its func-
tions."' Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime Environmental
Damage: Challenges to International Law After the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 405,468
n.430 (1995).
61 Id. at 470 (quoting U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg. at 32, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2951 (1990)) [hereinafter Hearings] (speech of Mr. AJ-Anbari of Iraq).
62 Low, supra note 60, at 470 n.439 (citing Hearings, supra note 61, at 58)
(speech of Mr. Alarcon de Quesada of Cuba).
63 See Low, supra note 60, at 471-72 (noting that "the adjudication of claims is
not outside the power of the Security Council simply because it is a judicial func-
tion").
64 Christopher Greenwood, State Responsibility and Civil Liability for Environ-
mental Damage Caused by Military Operations, in 69 INTERNATIONAL LAW STuDIEs:
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3.3. F4 Claims
There are six categories of UNCC claims: four categories that
cover individual claims (A-D), one covering corporate claims (E),
and one for claims by governments and international organizations
(F).65 Many of the individual and corporate claims implicate the
environmental impact of Iraq's actions. For example, "monies
were awarded for a claim by a corporation for the costs of repaint-
ing a small facility in Saudi Arabia, near the Kuwaiti border, that
had been covered with oily smoke from the Gulf War Oil Fires."
66
However, specific environmental claims fall into the F category, the
lowest priority category of claims.
67
By the February 1, 1997 filing deadline for F claims, the UNCC
received approximately 300 category F claims, forty-seven of which
were F4 claims for damage to the environment.68 F4 Claims cover
expenses or losses arising from:
(a) Abatement and prevention of environmental damage,
including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires and
stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international wa-
ters; (b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and re-
store the environment or future measures which can be
documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore
the environment; (c) Reasonable monitoring and assess-
ment of the environmental damage for the purposes of
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT 397, 405 (Richard J.
Grunawalt et al., eds.) (1996) (citation omitted).
65 UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE CLAIMS, at http://www
.unog.ch/uncc/theclaims.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
66 David D. Caron, The Place of the Environment in International Tribunals, in
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 11, at 250, 252 (citing Re-
port and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning the First
Instalment of "E2" Claims, U.N. Compensation Commission, para. 251, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/1998/7 (1998), approved by Decision 53 of the UNCC Governing Coun-
cil).
67 See UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, CATEGORY "F" CLAIMS
[hereinafter "F" CLAIMS] ("'F4' claims are claims for damage to the environ-
ment."), at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/claims/fclaims.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2002).
68 Id. Although the deadline for filing F claims was in 1997, and the UNCC
expects to process all claims by 2003, parties may suffer from impacts, particularly
environmental health impacts, that may not manifest themselves for years. Be-
cause of the time frame established for the commission, Iraq receives a windfall of
sorts as it escapes compensating these parties for their injuries.
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evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the envi-
ronment; (d) Reasonable monitoring of public health and
performing medical screenings for the purposes of investi-
gation and combating increased health risks as a result of
environmental damage; and (e) Depletion of or damage to
natural resources.69
F4 claims generally fall into two groups. The first group of
thirty claims, seeking $40 billion in compensation, is for environ-
mental damage and depletion of natural resources in the Persian
Gulf area.70 The second group of seventeen F4 claims seeks $23
million for costs incurred by governments in providing assistance
to countries that suffered the direct consequences of Iraq's ac-
tions.7'
The first panel of commissioners to review F4 claims was ap-
pointed in December 1988, and their report and recommendation
on F4 claims was issued on June 22, 2001.72 It is significant that a
full ten years passed between the issuance of Resolution 687 and
the first award of environmental damages. The low priority of F4
claims has frustrated the deterrent effect of the UNCC liability
provisions for environmentally damaging behavior, particularly as
it may inhibit successful collection of damages where there is a lim-
ited cash flow.73
F4 claims are notably challenging to administer because of the
difficulty of establishing that the alleged depletion of natural re-
sources and environmental damage resulted from Iraqi actions and
69 Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, U.N. Compensation Commission,
3d Sess., 18th mtg., para. 35, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter
Criteria], available at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/decision/dec_07r.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 11, 2002).
70 "F" CLAIMS, supra note 67.
71 Id.
72 Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Commissioners Concerning
the First Instalment of "F4" Claims, U.N. Compensation Commission, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/2001/16, para. 1 (2001) [hereinafter First Instalment], available at
http://www.unog.ch/uncc/reports/rOl-16.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
73 See Tiffani Y. Lee, Note, Environmental Liability Provisions Under the U.N.
Compensation Commission: Remarkable Achievement with Room for Improved Deter-
rence, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 209, 216 (1998) ("It is arguable that this delay [of
seven to eight years before the F claims were first addressed] has diminished
somewhat the full deterrent effect of the environmental liability provisions under
the UNCC."). See also discussion regarding compensation and cash flow infra Sec-
tion 3.4.
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not other forces.74 Valuation of environmental damages creates
another challenge for the panel.75 Most F4 claims are for compen-
sation for the actual and expected costs associated with remedia-
tion, assessment, and monitoring, claims to which market values
are readily assigned.76 However, as the panel moves forward to
evaluate substantive F4 claims, assigning values to alleged "deple-
tion of or damage to natural resources"'7 might prove more com-
plicated. As there may be no readily assigned market values for
impaired desert ecosystems or other environmental damages, the
Panel will confront a range of valuation techniques that may pro-
vide a range of answers. 78 The "monetary valuation of natural re-
sources (or environmental commodities) remains in a state of
flux" 79 and the UNCC is unlikely to find easy answers to any
valuation questions that may arise.
The F4 panel's first round of review focused on claims for
"monitoring and assessment of environmental damage, depletion
of natural resources, monitoring of public health, and performing
medical screenings for the purposes of investigation and combat-
ing increased health risks."80 Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait,
74 First Instalment, supra note 72, para. 33.
75 See Brian R. Binger et al., The Use of Contingent Valuation Methodology in
Natural Resource Damage Assessments: Legal Fact and Economic Fiction, 89 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1029 (1995).
Environmental goods are not like fungible manufactured goods, such as
automobiles and buildings, which are regularly traded and for which
there usually exist market price data and widely accepted methods of
valuation. Natural resources, in contrast, tend to be nonmarketed com-
modities that generally are not subject to more traditional methods of
appraisal and valuation .... In such cases, attempts to value the damage
or loss to the public can rise to metaphysical dimensions.
Id. at 1030. A vast body of work exists on the valuation of natural resource
damages. For a relevant bibliography, see RICHARD W. DUNFORD ET AL.,
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LAW ARTICLES (Triangle
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. G-8901, 1998).
76 Jay Austin & Carl Bruch, The Greening of Warfare, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec.
1998, at 32, 37 [hereinafter Greening of Warfare].
77 Criteria, supra note 69, para. 35.
78 Valuation approaches that might apply include ecological valuation, con-
tingent valuation, and random utility modeling. For a discussion of these tech-
niques, see C.A. ULIBARRI & K.F. WELLMAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATURAL
RESOURCE VALUATION: A PRIMER ON CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES (1997), available at
http://tis.eh.doe.gov/oepa/guidance/cercla/valuation.pdf.
79 Id. at 6.
80 First Instalment, supra note 72, para. 3.
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and Syria requested that awards for these claims be made first be-
cause an award of monitoring and assessment funds could pay for
research to bolster their later substantive claims.81 Although con-
cern was expressed that these claims might not reflect damages
caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the panel noted that con-
clusive proof of causation was not "a prerequisite for a monitoring
and assessment activity to be compensable."8 2 The panel only re-
quired that there should be a "sufficient nexus" between Iraq's ac-
tivities and the environmental damage.83 Despite the apparent
flexibility of these guidelines, the panel recommended an award of
only 4.1% of the total amount claimed by the parties.84 The panel
decreased some of the claims where "savings [could] be achieved
by coordinating activities of a claimant relating to the same subject
matter."85 However, the parties cannot be overly optimistic about
the prospects for their substantive claims based on these findings.
Indeed, such a low success rate further undermines the deterrent
capability of such measures and threatens the value of the UNCC
as a source of funds for environmental restoration.
3.4. Compensation and Cash Flow
The F4 Panel's decision to recommend such small awards may
be a product of the UNCC's limited cash flow. Based on a recom-
mendation from the President of the Security Council, compensa-
tion to be paid into the fund by Iraq was established at a maximum
rate of "30 per cent [sic] of the annual value of the exports of petro-
leum and petroleum products from Iraq."86 It was anticipated that
this would generate approximately $6 billion for the fund.8 7 This
initial projection failed, as Iraq did not export any oil until Decem-
81 Id. paras. 15-16. See discussion regarding compensation and cash flow infra
Section 3.4.
82 First Instalment, supra note 72, para. 30.
83 Id. para. 31. "Sufficient nexus" was not defined.
84 The total amount claimed by the six countries was $1,007,412,574; the
amount recommended by the panel was $243,234,967. Id. para. 779, tbl.14.
85 Id. para. 37.
86 S.C. Res. 705, U.N. SCOR., 3004th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/705 (1991) (citing
Note of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 13 of His Report of 2 May 1991,
U.N. Doc. S/22661 (1991), available at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio
/res22661.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2002)). The percentage was chosen based on
expected Iraqi oil exports for 1993 of $21 billion. Id. para. 4.
87 Rosemary E. Libera, Note, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation for
Wartime Damages, 24 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 291, 297 (2001).
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ber 1996. Resolution 706 lifted the U.N. imposed oil embargo on
Iraq for a six-month sale period in 1991.88 Iraq was allowed to re-
ceive up to $1.6 billion in oil profits with thirty percent to go to the
UNCC and the rest to fund humanitarian purchases. Iraq refused
to submit to this plan, and no funds were generated for the UNCC.
Instead, loans from the U.N. Working Capital fund and, under
Resolution 778,89 frozen oil revenues held by other countries, went
into an escrow account from which the commission could collect
thirty percent.90 Using this funding source, the UNCC was able to
compensate all claimants who had suffered serious personal inju-
ries by December 1996.91 While compensation was thus achieved,
the deterrent aspects of the program were temporarily foiled, as
Iraq contributed no revenue to the fund.
In 1995, Resolution 986 created the "oil-for-food program" un-
der which Iraq could sell oil in exchange for humanitarian goods.92
Iraq relented from its initial rejection of the program and in 1996,
exported oil for the first time since the beginning of the Gulf con-
flict.93 The initial ceiling for Iraqi oil revenues was set at $4 billion
per year.94 In 1999, Resolution 1284 abolished the ceiling on au-
thorized Iraqi oil revenues.95 In 2000, humanitarian concerns about
the situation in Iraq prompted a change in the percentage of oil
revenues directed to the compensation fund to twenty-five per-
cent.96 Since the inception of the oil-for-food program, the com-
mission has been able to make periodic compensation payments to
successful claimants.
88 S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 3004th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/706 (1991), avail-
able at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res0706.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
2002).
89 S.C. Res. 778, U.N. SCOR, 3117th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/778 (1992), avail-
able at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res0778.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
2002).
90 Libera, supra note 87, at 297-98.
91 Id. at 298.
92 S.C. Res. 986, U.N. SCOR, 3519th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (1995), avail-
able at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res0986.pdf (last visited Jan. 20,
2002).
93 Libera, supra note 87, at 298.
94 Id.
95 UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, PAYMENT PROCEDURE, at
http://www.unog.ch/uncc/paymproc.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
96 S.C. Res. 1330, U.N. SCOR, 4241st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1330 (2000),
para. 12, available at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/resolutio/res1330.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2002).
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The past success of claim administration through the UNCC
does not guarantee its continued viability. The Security Council
generally renews the oil-for-food program for periods of 150 to 180
days.97 If Iraq's dependence on the program for food and humani-
tarian supplies ceases or if the Security Council decides not to re-
new the program for another reason,98 there may be no funds for
future panels to award parties with pending claims such as the
substantive F4 claims.99
3.5. Lessons Learned: Can the UNCC Model Work Elsewhere?
Overall, the UNCC has been a success. By November 15th,
2001, the Commission had awarded nearly $14 trillion in compen-
sation to 1,506,458 claimants. 00 It is likely that the U.N. will try to
follow this model in the future. An indication of this is the Secu-
rity Council's rejection of "a proposed amendment to the Gulf War
cease-fire agreement that would have held the Gulf War unique
and the remedies lacking precedential value." 101 But can the
UNCC model really work to impose civil liability for wartime
damages in other contexts? The chief limitation of the model is its
economic feasibility. Rosemary Libera argues that "[i]n order to be
the compensating party, a country must have some form of wealth
that has a high degree of liquidity, that was not destroyed during
97 The oil-for-food program was last renewed for a 180-day period beginning
May 30, 2002. S.C. Res. 1409, U.N. SCOR, 4531st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1409
(2002), para. 1.
9S The future of the oil-for-food program may turn on the outcome of a
United Nations move to readmit representatives of its Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) into Iraq. See UN-Iraq Talks Open in Vi-
enna on Practical Arrangements for Return of Inspectors, UN NEWS SERV., Sept. 30,
2002 (discussing negotiations between the UN and Iraq on the conditions for re-
admission of weapons instructors), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news
/printnews.asp?nid=4875. If Saddam Hussein does not comply with a new round
of weapons inspections, the Security Council may very well reconsider the status
of the program. Even if Iraq's refusal to comply did not terminate the oil-for-food
program, a threatened U.S. war against Iraq could adversely affect the availability
of funds for the UNCC. See David E. Sanger, A New Look at U.S. Goal, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2002, at Al (discussing President Bush's efforts to build a coalition
against Iraq).
99 Lee, supra note 73, at 217-18.
100 The actual amount awarded to date is $15,549,384,226.59. Press Release,
U.N. Compensation Commission, United Nations Compensation Commission
Pays out $708,074,583.11 Guly 18, 2002), available at http://www.unog.ch/uncc
/pressrel/prp21807.pdf.
101 Libera, supra note 87, at 301.
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the conflict, that is easily accessible to the U.N., and that is not pri-
vately owned."' 0 2 Countries with this type of wealth may be de-
terred from undertaking illegal aggression by the threat of an effec-
tive system of civil liability. If they are not, compensation may
proceed successfully. However, many countries do not meet this
economic profile. These countries will remain undeterred and any
compensation scheme involving them is likely to fail as a deterrent
to environmentally harmful belligerent conduct.103
The success of the UNCC as a remedy for wartime environ-
mental damages is also unclear. As the final awards for environ-
mental damages have not yet been recommended, the verdict is
out on whether the awards will be sufficient to affect the environ-
mental remediation required in the countries affected by the oil
fires and oil spills. The Commission's relatively short time frame
for filing claims did not adequately address potential long-term in-
juries. 104 The low priority given to recompensing parties with
environmental injuries hazards a complete failure of compensation
for these parties where funds are available but are more limited
than in Iraq's case. It is not clear why (other than their complexity)
environmental claims should be dealt with last, or if this prioritiza-
tion will severely impact their success.
4. CURRENT CONFLICT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THE AL QAEDA TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THE ANTHRAX LETTERS
While the past focus on wartime environmental devastation
has looked at the effect of combat on the natural environment (Viet-
nam's jungles, the Persian Gulf, and Kuwait's deserts), recent
events demonstrate that the urban environment may also suffer the
consequences of belligerent conduct.
4.1. The World Trade Center Attack
On September 11, 2001, the environmental consequences of a
belligerent attack materialized in the United States. When two hi-
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., id. at 311 (citing Serbia as an example of a country that would be
undeterred by the UNCC model).
104 Another option for dealing with damages manifested after initial claims
are filed would be to allow for "a reopener clause for changed conditions" as ex-
ists in many Superfund settlements. Greening of Warfare, supra note 76, at 36. See
also discussion of delayed manifestation of environmental consequences, includ-
ing health issues, supra note 68.
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jacked jetliners were deliberately flown into New York City's twin
World Trade Center towers, an abundance of pollutants may have
been released into the air and soil. 05 Any attempt to recover dam-
ages for the environmental costs of the attack will be impeded by
the difficulty of allocating cleanup costs between environmental
costs and other costs such as the clearing of debris. This difficulty
is compounded by the fact that the true environmental effects will
be difficult to quantify. Air pollution and soil contamination al-
most certainly existed in the area of the Trade Towers prior to Sep-
tember 11.
The most difficult question to answer is who should pay for the
environmental cleanup.106 It does not seem that the UNCC model
can apply directly here, where the perpetrator is not a state gov-
ernment, but rather a terrorist organization. While the now cus-
tomary law of the Hague and Geneva Conventions might apply to
Al Qaeda's actions, ENMOD and Protocol I may not, as Al Qaeda
is not a signatory to the treaties. As in the case of Iraq, a resolution
might be adopted to establish Al Qaeda or Osama Bin Laden's li-
ability for the environmental cleanup, but the issue of liquidity re-
mains. Bin Laden and his network are alleged to have ties to sub-
stantial wealth,107 but it may be impossible to identify and gain
access to all of their funding sources.108
105 Early testing found elevated levels of asbestos, dioxin, PCBs, and volatile
organic compounds. For a summary of possible health risks and environmental
monitoring at the site in the initial weeks following the attack, see Press Release,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA and OSHA Web Sites Provide Envi-
ronmental Monitoring Data From World Trade Center and Surrounding Areas
(Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/wtc/summaries/epa-osha0l.htm
(last visited Oct. 15, 2002). See also David W. Dunlap, A Big Victim Is Still Empty
After a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at C4 (describing the extent of lead, mer-
cury, and asbestos contamination in the former Federal Office building located at
90 Church Street, yards away from ground zero, where the cleanup cost was pro-
jected to "run into the tens of millions of dollars"); U.S. ENVMONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, HEALTH EFFECTS OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE (dis-
cussing the short and long term health effects of the dust released by the World
Trade Center collapse), at http://www.epa.gov/wtc/factsheets/wtchealth.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
106 So far, U.S. taxpayers have footed the bill for many of the costs associated
with September 11 through allocations to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA"). Following the attack, President Bush pledged over $20 billion
in federal aid to New York. Of that, at least $2.7 billion was allocated for "disaster
relief for cleanup at the site paid through [FEMA]." Raymond Hernandez, Bush
Offers Details of Aid to New York Topping $20 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,2002, at Al.
107 Al Qaeda is alleged to have raised money through charities, for-profit en-
tities, financial institutions, and the Internet. See PATRIOT Act Oversight: Investi-
gating Patterns of Terrorist Fundraising, Before the House Committee on Financial Ser-
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Al Qaeda funds that have already been seized 09 might be used
to fund the cleanup. But several lawsuits filed against Bin Laden
since September 11110 pose a problem similar to that created by the
UNCC prioritization scheme. If the lawsuits are successful, the
limited available assets would likely first fund damage awards to
cover the immediate medical needs of attack victims and to com-
pensate families who lost loved ones. Again, it appears that the
currently available solutions may not succeed in financing the
cleanup.
vices Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Steven Emerson, Executive Director, House Financial Services), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/021202se.pdf (providing details
on organizations alleged to have provided support to the terrorist network).
108 See Krysten Crawford, Drawing a Bead on Terrorism Funds Financial Fight
May Be Mission Impossible, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, National Section, at 1 (re-
porting the goals of the U.S. PATRIOT Act and the obstacles faced in successfully
terminating the flow of money to terrorist organizations). See also Colum Lynch,
War on Al Qaeda Funds Stalled, WASH. POST., Aug. 29, 2002, at Al ("A global cam-
paign to block al Qaeda's access to money has stalled, enabling the terrorist net-
work to obtain a fresh infusion of tens of millions of dollars and putting it in a po-
sition to finance future attacks, according to a draft U.N. report.").
109 "Bush administration officials have persuaded American and interna-
tional banks and governments to seize about $80 billion linked to nearly 170 busi-
nesses and individuals." Joseph Kahn, Afghanistan Gets Access to Frozen Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at A10. However, this estimate of frozen funds may
have been too high. More recently it was reported that "[i]n the months immedi-
ately following the Sept. 11 attack, the United States and other U.N. members
moved to shut down al Qaeda's financial network, freezing more than $112 million
in assets belonging to suspected members and supporters of the organization."
Lynch, supra note 108, at Al (emphasis added). Since January, 2002, "only $10
million in additional funds has been blocked." Id.
110 See Robert Gearty, Judge: Use TV to Tell Osama You're Suing, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Jan. 11, 2002, at 4 (detailing a judge's ruling that Afghan and Pakistani
newspapers and broadcast outlets could be used to notify Osama Bin Laden that
two families of World Trade Center victims are suing him); Jennifer Lin, Families
of Sept. 11 Victims Sue Bin Laden and Supporters, PHILA. INQUIRER (online edition),
Feb. 19, 2002 (discussing the first class action lawsuit against Bin Laden and his
network), at http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/2703226.htm?template
=contentModules/printstory.jsp; $116 Trillion Lawsuit Filed by 9/11 Families,
CNN.coM, Aug. 16, 2002 (describing the fifteen-count, $116 trillion lawsuit filed
by over 600 families of September 11 victims against "seven international banks;
eight Islamic foundations, charities and their subsidiaries; individual terrorist fi-
nanciers; the Saudi bin Laden Group; three Saudi Princes; and the government of
Sudan for allegedly bankrolling the terrorist al Qaeda network, Osama bin Laden
and the Taliban"), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/15/attacks.suit.
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4.2. The Anthrax Letters
The series of anthrax-laced letters mailed to certain members of
the American media and government and to several government
facilities following the September 11 tragedies illustrates another
possible environmental consequence of belligerent conduct, this
time impacting the indoor environment. While the letters caused
only twenty-two infections and five deaths,"' they strained the re-
sources of the American government and public health system.
"Activities of all branches of the federal government were dis-
rupted, approximately 300 postal and other facilities were tested
for the presence of anthrax spores, and approximately 32,000 per-
sons initiated antimicrobial prophylaxis following potential expo-
sure to B. anthracis at workplaces in Florida, New Jersey, New
York, and Washington, D.C."112
While in most facilities the environmental consequences of the
anthrax itself were remedied within a relatively short period of
time, some of the remediation measures may have as yet unknown
detrimental effects. Chlorine dioxide, "an antimicrobial pesticide,"
was used to fumigate the contaminated Hart Senate Office Build-
ing13 and, since the contaminated letters were discovered, mail
sent to offices on Capitol Hill has been irradiated as a prophylactic
measure. n 4 Capitol Hill workers have since complained of feeling
III James M. Hughes & Julie Louise Gerberding, Anthrax Bioterrorism: Lessons
Learned and Future Directions, 8 EMERGING INFEcnous DISEASES 1013, 1013, available
at http://www.cdc.gov/nddod/FID/vo8nolO/pdf/02-0466.pdf. Other biologi-
cal agents might be used to cause wider-reaching environmental effects. Biologi-
cal weapons could contaminate water or food supplies. In an early example of
biological warfare, ancient Romans poisoned their enemies' drinking water by
throwing carrion into wells. Steven M. Block, The Growing Threat of Biological
Weapons, AM. ScIENTIST, Jan.-Feb. 2001, available at http://www.americanscientist
.org/articles/Olarticles/Block.html (last visited Oct. 22,2002).
112 Fighting Bioterrorism: Using America's Scientists And Entrepreneurs to Find
Solutions: Hearing on Fighting Terrorism Before the United States Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space,
107th Cong. 2 (2002) (prepared testimony of Richard J. Hatchett, MD Coordinator,
Civilian Medical Reserve Working Group, Clinical Assistant Attending, Memorial
Hospital Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center), available at http://commerce
.senate.gov/hearings/0205hatchett.pdf.
113 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS,
CHLORINE DIOXIDE, available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets
/chlorinedioxidefactsheet.htm (updated Jan. 15, 2002).
114 Ellen Gamerman, Hill Workers Feel Irritated by Irradiated Envelopes; Congres-
sional Aides Say Mail Sickens Them, BALT. SUN, Feb. 20, 2002, at 1A.
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ill while at work and some suspect the irradiated mail is to
blame. 1 5
While the final tally of the cleanup costs has not yet been made,
the anthrax attacks will likely have been very expensive for the
United States." 6 If the perpetrator of the attacks is found, should
he or she be liable for the remediation efforts and any long-term
environmental health consequences of the anthrax or cleanup
methods? In 1925, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacterio-
logical Methods of Warfare" 7 was the first international provision
to condemn the use of biological weapons in warfare. The ban was
not absolute; many parties to the convention made reservations,
including "that the ban would not be effective if a state party vio-
lated the 1925 Geneva Protocol by using biological weapons
first."118 That said, the anthrax letters present a clear case of "first
use" of biological weapons, and the perpetrator is likely to be
found liable for a violation of international law.
Assuming liability can be established, the problem of liquidity
presents itself again. If the perpetrator is an individual, it is im-
probable that he or she will have the resources available to afford
the cleanup of the offices and postal facilities affected. Given the
likely inability of perpetrators to cover the cleanup costs, who
should pay for the environmental consequences of belligerent ac-
tions?119
115 Id.
116 As of March 6, 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency had spent $23
million to test for and clean up anthrax contamination at buildings on Capitol
Hill. Meredith Preston, Superfund: Cost for Anthrax Cleanup in Congress Reaches $23
Million, EPA Tells Grassley, 45 Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at A-5 (Mar. 7,2002).
117 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous,
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 44
L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 137-46 (A. Roberts & R.
Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989).
118 David P. Fidler, International Law and Public Health Consequences of Armed
Conflict, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR, supra note 11, at 444, 450.
119 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") "has been paying for
the emergency response activities from its Superfund Trust Fund, which is also
used to pay for cleanups at superfund sites for which no responsible party can be
found." Preston, supra note 116, at A-5. The EPA "does not know how much it
will be able to reimburse the Superfund Trust Fund." Id. If the cleanup of bio-
logical terrorism exhausts the trust fund, as it might given the likelihood of future
attacks, toxic waste sites across the United States and their associated public
health consequences will go unremediated. Additionally, countries other than the
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5. LOOKING AHEAD: FINANCING A GLOBAL FUND FOR WARTIME
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
As already noted, the problems of prioritization of environ-
mental claims and liquidity of responsible parties will almost al-
ways be present in the context of belligerent conduct. While the
UNCC was a positive step towards providing resources to remedy
the environmental damages of war, it is a solution that may not
prove effective in every context. 20 A separate fund dedicated to
environmental damages could eliminate the problems of liquidity
and prioritization.' 2' This fund could also be structured to deal
with the uncertain long-term environmental consequences of com-
bat. 22 One of the fundamental issues in the creation of such a fund
is how it might be financed.
5.1. Voluntary Contributions
Today, many international activities are funded voluntarily.123
While such an approach has had some success, some argue that it
has the tendency to focus efforts on the preferences of those who
United States may not have the same type of Superfund system in place, leaving
the question of "who pays?" in similar attacks elsewhere unanswered.
120 Civil conflict is one of the biggest threats to ecosystems in many countries
today. Often fueled by existing environmental problems, these conflicts can cre-
ate a positive feedback system leading to further environmental problems. Bellig-
erent parties in these conflicts are extremely unlikely to have the resources avail-
able for remediation. See, e.g., Civil Conflict Poses Biggest Threat to Ecosystem in
Angola, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, June 6, 2001 (reporting remarks of the Angolan
Minister of Fishing and Environment on the environmental effects of the Angolan
Civil war); Lina Sagaral Reyes, War Extracts Heavy Toll on Environment, PHILA.
INQUIRER, June 19, 2000, at 1 (describing the effect on the environment of military
efforts to sweep out Islamic rebels). See also Peace & Conflict Studies Program,
University of Toronto, Environmental Security Database (containing information
on books, journal articles, papers, and newspaper clippings pertaining to the
study of environmental stress and violent conflict in developing countries), at
http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/database/libintro.htm (last updated May
19,1999).
121 Greening of Warfare, supra note 76, at 40. Former Soviet president Mikhail
Gorbachev "called for the creation of a 'new international emergency fund' to
remediate environmental damages caused by military conflict" in a June 1998
speech at the Smithsonian Institution. Id. at 32.
122 Id. at 36. Jay Austin and Carl Bruch argue for the creation of "a long term
fund to monitor, remediate, and compensate for long-term damages if and when
they become evident." Id.
123 CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT AND THE HUMAN AGENDA 203 (1993) [hereinafter GNAT].
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contribute the most.124 This approach thus raises concerns as to-
day's wartime environmental damages are often caused by some of
the wealthiest nations.
In Kosovo, NATO's use of depleted uranium shells may have
contaminated drinking water supplies, and NATO bombing of a
petrochemical complex in Pancevo, outside of Belgrade, is said to
have created a "Bhopal-type disaster," unleashing a cloud of toxic
chemicals.125 Similarly, the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan
will leave a landscape littered with craters and pollutants. 26 It is
unlikely that these wealthy and powerful parties will volunteer to
pay the full costs of cleanup for the environmental damage caused
by their activities. 127 Clearly, a different financing tactic is neces-
sary.
5.2. Taxes
A more advantageous alternative might be to finance the
cleanup fund through a tax system rather than through voluntary
contributions.128 Taxes would produce a stable and continuous
124 Stone writes:
Characterizing their contributions as "voluntary giving," the donor na-
tions want a fund governed along the lines of, or even under the control
of, the World Bank. That is because the bank's management departs
from one nation, one vote to reflect the amount of funds that a country is
providing. By contrast, the LDCs want the funds distributed by a new
agency (a "Green Fund") that will be governed on a one-nation, one-vote
basis, irrespective of contributions.
Id. at 204.
125 A.C. Thompson, War Without End, THE NATION (Online Edition), Dec. 17,
2001, at http://thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20011217&s=thompson20 0 ll 2O2 (last
visited Oct. 23, 2002).
126 Fred Pearce, The Wasteland: Afghanistan Will Remain Scarred by War Long
After the Bombing Stops, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 5, 2002, at 4 ("Bombing will also leave
its mark beyond the obvious craters. Defence analysts say that... conventional
explosives will litter the country with pollutants. They contain toxic compounds
such as cyclonite, a carcinogen, and rocket propellants contain perchlorates,
which damage thyroid glands.").
127 The parties would likely justify their failure to volunteer cleanup costs
based on the perceived humanitarian value of their campaigns and on the costs
already incurred in their efforts to remove unpopular or politically incorrect re-
gimes.
128 Taxes in the environmental context are seen as a way to "bring the costs of
pollution and other costs of using the environment- called externalities - into the
prices of goods and services produced by economic activity." EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES SERIES No. 1, ENVIRONMENTAL
TAxES: IMPLEMENTATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFEcrIvENEss 15 (1996), available at
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stream of income for the fund. This stability would allow the fund
to operate with greater independence from the more powerful na-
tions and to focus on providing aid where it is needed, regardless
of who is responsible for the damages.129 However, a broad-
spectrum tax on all nations, regardless of their involvement in
causing wartime environmental damages, is unlikely to garner
support. Most parties will require a correlation between the fund-
ing source and its use. Jay Austin and Carl Baruch recommend a
tax system with "the heaviest burden on states most likely to cause
environmental damage in war.., calculated on the basis of the size
of the army, the size of the arsenal, the types of weapons in the ar-
senal, etc."130
The 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,' 3 ' as amended
by the 1992 Fund Convention ("1992 Fund"), 132 provides an exam-
ple of how this funding model could work. The Convention estab-
lishes a regime for compensating victims of oil pollution damage
when a ship owner does not or cannot pay the full costs of cleanup
plus any ordered compensation. The 1992 Fund is financed by
taxes on any person in a state that is a party to the 1992 Fund Con-
vention who has received more than 150,000 tons of "contributing
http://reports.eea.eu.int/92-9167-000-6/en/gt.pdf. Environmental taxes also
"provide[ ] an incentive to avoid the tax by using or generating less of the sub-
stance being taxed." Id. at 17. Some environmental taxes have done a good job of
reducing the use of scarce resources or diminishing environmental pollution. Id.
at 29-32. Taxes used to support a global fund for wartime environmental dam-
ages might similarly reduce negative externalities and provide incentives to avoid
destructive behavior. For a review of the effectiveness of several environmental
taxes imposed in European countries, see id.
129 Of course, this independence is precisely what might prevent these na-
tions for providing their support for such a system. GNAT, supra note 123, at 206.
130 Greening of Warfare, supra note 76, at 41.
131 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18,1971,1110 U.N.T.S. 57.
132 International Oil Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention
on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage, Nov. 27, 1992 [hereinafter Protocol of 1992], available at http://www
.iopcfund.org/engtextoc.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). Note, however, that the
United States was not a signatory to the 1971 Convention or the 1992 Protocol.
This provides further support for the argument that a fund like this might not be
successful in the context of wartime environmental damages, as the wealthiest
parties are unlikely to surrender decision-making on liability and assessment lev-
els to an independent body.
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oil" in a calendar year.133 States party to the convention are re-
quired to report the names of all persons responsible to contribute
to the 1992 Fund "whether the receiver of oil is a Government au-
thority, a State-owned company or a private company." 134 The
Fund's Assembly annually determines the amount to be levied on
contributing parties per ton of oil received.
35
An international fund for wartime environmental damages
could develop a similar assessment system whereby persons or
parties who purchase or accept weapons, munitions, and other war
materials above some threshold quantity would pay a tax for each
additional increment of military hardware obtained. However, the
administrative feasibility of such a system is dubious; unlike oil
purchases, many countries would be unwilling to publicize their
defense transactions. Many countries would oppose an interna-
tional body that required the disclosure of the full extent of their
defense spending and would be unlikely to ratify any proposal re-
quiring them to do so.136 To be successful, an assessment scheme
like this would require careful political balancing and, most likely,
cooperation from one or more of the wealthy and powerful na-
tions.
5.3. Permit Financing
Another option might be to not tie the fund's financing to indi-
cators of possible environmental damages from belligerent con-
duct, but instead to finance the fund through a permit system.
137
The fund's administrators could establish a baseline level of envi-
ronmental damages from combat above and beyond which poten-
tial belligerent parties would be required to purchase permits
133 THE INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, THE
INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUND 1992: EXPLANATORY NOTE
PREPARED BY THE 1992 FUND SECRETARIAT, para. 3.5 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/gen-note.pdf.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 The United States, ever suspicious of international intrusion into its deci-
sions, is a likely non-participant in such an arrangement. See, e.g., discussion supra
notes 33 and 132.
137 See GNAT, supra note 123, at 215 (arguing for a permit auction system to
finance a "Global Commons Trust Fund" to pay for damages to the global envi-
ronment). Permit systems have gained much support in the context of air quality.
A permit system for "pollution trading" was implemented for sulfur dioxide
emissions in the United States under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 42
U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651(o) (1994).
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should they foresee the need to cause further environmental dam-
ages.13 8 The number of permits for environmental damages (or al-
lowances) issued by the administrators would be established at a
level that ensured that the market price would provide cleanup
funding for baseline damages in addition to any increment of addi-
tional damages allowed by the allocated permits. Limiting the
number of available permits and making them available at auction
would, in theory, drive up the prices of the permits and create ad-
ditional income for the fund while deterring combatants from
causing environmental harm (particularly if the penalty scale were
adjusted in accordance with permit prices).139 The fund's adininis-
trators would require belligerents who caused damages above the
baseline level allowed by their permits to pay penalties set at a
level high enough to deter parties from causing environmental
damages without first purchasing a permit and, in essence, provid-
ing a security deposit for any cleanup.
Again, however, this system may prove administratively unat-
tainable. As with any issue involving environmental damages, a
permit system raises valuation problems.140 When the costs of po-
tential environmental consequences are unknown, how is it possi-
ble to determine the number of permits to allocate in order to en-
sure that the permit market will generate revenues sufficient to
cover cleanup costs? Further, some may object to a permit system,
"calling it offensive to permit [environmental damages]-for-pay.
The answer to this protestation is that some [environmental conse-
quences of combat are] inevitable, and it is more of an outrage that
133 There are three steps central to constructing a tradable pollution allow-
ance regime: first, the acceptable level of pollution must be established; then al-
lowances are allocated; finally, trading is allowed. Jonathan Remy Nash, Too
Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the "Polluter Pays"
Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 465, 483 (2000). A permit system for environ-
mental damages from belligerent conduct would function similarly.
139 In the air-emissions context:
The fixed supply of permits, created by law, sets the cap on total emis-
sions; the trading process allows industry to decide where and how it is
most economical to reduce emissions to fit under the cap.... Congress,
the EPA, or other officials set the emissions cap, and the market does the
rest.
Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553,1582 (2002).
140 See Binger, supra note 75, at 1030 ("[N]atural resource damage valuation is
not always an easy task and can be fraught with a wide variety of inherent inaccu-
racies and methodological weaknesses.").
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we let the polluters get away with it, as they presently do, free of
charge." 141 But the deterrence capability of this system is also
questionable. What is to stop belligerents who cannot afford the
permits in the first place from causing environmental harms,
knowing the fund would be unable to collect penalty fees from
them either? 142 Recognizing this problem, wealthy parties might
be unlikely to agree to such an arrangement, fearing they will be
left to pay the bill when poorer countries fail to live up to their end
of the bargain.143
As an alternative, instead of requiring those who engage in
combat to have permits, permit requirements could be imposed on
the producers of military hardware. This proposal would also be
unlikely to succeed. As with the tax proposal, it might be difficult
for an international body to gain complete information about
weapons production in each country.144 And as demonstrated
since September 11, traditional military hardware is not always a
necessary element of belligerent combat. 4 Additionally, manufac-
turers would be likely to pass the permit costs along to those who
141 GNAT, supra note 123, at 214. See also IMichael J. Sandel, Editorial, It's Im-
moral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23 ("[T]uming pol-
lution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral stigma that is
properly associated with it.").
142 "Lack of proper enforcement will defeat efforts to trade emission credits,"
or, in this case, permits for environmentally destructive belligerent conduct. Jef-
frey C. Fort & Cynthia A. Faur, Can Emissions Trading Work Beyond a National Pro-
gram?: Some Practical Observations on the Available Tools, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L.
463, 470 (1997).
143 As Fort and Faur point out in the emissions context, "[T]here must be a
market to facilitate an effective resource allocation in an international emission
trading program." Id. at 474. If parties choose not to participate in a permit sys-
tem for wartime environmental damages, the market may fail and not achieve its
goal of generating revenue for the global remediation fund.
144 Again, compare the emissions context "[w]here emission budgets or emis-
sion inventories are based on faulty or incomplete information, the trading pro-
gram participants who have precise data are handicapped and potentially put at a
competitive disadvantage." Id. at 470. Incomplete information is a likely scenario
in the context of weapons production. Cf. Howard Schneider, Defiant Iraq Will Not
Allow New U.N. Arms Inspectors to Enter, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2000, at A26 (dis-
cussing Iraq's refusal to readmit a U.N. Weapons Inspection team following their
withdrawal eighteen months earlier "after being denied access to suspected
weapons facilities").
145 Armed only with knives and boxcutters, the September eleventh hijackers
were able to destroy the World Trade Center towers. See David Johnston & James
Risen, After the Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at Al ("[E]ach flight was seized
by ... hijackers who boarded as passengers, then, with knives and boxcutters,
overwhelmed the crew.").
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purchase their weapons, furthering the power imbalance between
wealthy and poor nations: many poor nations purchase weapons
from companies in the developed industrial nations. Lesser-
developed countries would be unlikely to agree to an arrangement
with these consequences.
6. CONCLUSION
Following an attack, it is natural to focus recovery efforts on
repairing the immediate damage to human lives. Yet, the envi-
ronmental consequences of belligerent conduct should not be ig-
nored. If left unaddressed, the long-term impacts of environmental
damages may have serious consequences for human health, eco-
nomic stability, and future ecosystem balance.
Existing military law has tried, with some success, to prevent
environmental harm from occurring at all. Where these efforts
have failed, the international community has begun to recognize
the need to provide a structure for remediation. Further interna-
tional cooperation will be necessary to overcome the liquidity
problems that hinder most attempts to provide adequate environ-
mental remediation. Any solution must consider the possibility
that a state government may not be responsible for a large-scale in-
temational attack. While no one solution seems to provide an easy
answer, the international community should consider all available
financing schemes in an effort to develop an international fund
dedicated to the remediation of the environmental consequences of
belligerent conduct.
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